|
The
plaintiff-appellant, Jane Doe’, appealed an adverse summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, The Standard Fire Insurance
Company(Standard Fire), finding no coverage under its policy of
liability insurance for her various claims asserted against its
insured in this litigation. On April 17, 2001, the plaintiff filed
a petition for damages, naming as defendants Mr. Breedlove, Mr.
Griffin, Mr. Gahagan, Mr. Gahagan’s father, the owners of
Yesterday’s, and the then unknown liability insurers of
those parties. She alleged that Mr. Breedlove administered a drug
to her which rendered her unconscious, which act was facilitated
by Mr. Griffin and Mr. Gahagan, and that the three entered her
residence without her consent. She further alleged that they then
entered her bedroom and engaged in sexual relations with her without
her consent, causing her personal injury through their “negligence
and/or fault.” She subsequently served an amended petition
identifying the insurers of Mr. Breedlove and The First Circuit initially addressed the threshold issue of whether the event forming the basis of the plaintiff’s claims comes within the scope of coverage of Standard Fire’s policy. Standard Fire defended the trial court’s judgment by asserting that the alleged event for which the plaintiff seeks recovery does not meet the policy definition of an “occurrence,” and therefore simply does not fall within the contractual scope of coverage. The First Circuit decided that the claimed injuries are alleged to have been unwelcome and unexpected from the viewpoint of the plaintiff, the victim. As such, they are obviously the result of an “accident” in terms of her expectation, regardless of her position as to the intent behind Mr. Breedlove’s actions. Thus, the plaintiff claimed damages by reason of an “occurrence” as defined in the policy. The
Court could find no authority in Louisiana for recognition of
a cause of action for negligent initiation of sexual advances
or negligent infliction of sexual intercourse (let alone “conspiracy”
to commit those negligent acts), and declined to recognize such
novel theories.” It found no logical, compelling, or justifiable
reason to consider the intent behind the sexual battery of an
adult any differently from that behind the sexual molestation
of a minor and that as to the injuries or damages resulting from
a sexual battery or rape, intent should be inferred for purposes
of applying an “intentional act” exclusion. Accordingly,
the First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court
in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company, and against Jane
Doe, dismissing her claims against it with prejudice.
|
